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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RUSSELL GLENN JACOB, : Case No. 20040496-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Russell Jacob (Jacob) properly preserved his argument the pregnancy testimony 
was admissible under rules 608(c) and 412(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Moreover, this Court should reverse because the trial court erred by excluding the 
pregnancy evidence and the error was prejudicial. 
ARGUMENT 
L JACOB PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE 
PREGNANCY TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULES 
608(c) AND 412(b)(3) OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The State claims Jacob's argument is not preserved because he "raises a different 
theory for the cross-examination on appeal than he argued to the trial court/1 Aple. Br. at 
16-17. The preservation requirement exists because "the trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and "a defendant 
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing] 
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,... claiming] on 
appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74,T}11,10 P.3d 346 
(quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, an issue is preserved if 
"'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the 
issue."5" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(citations omitted); Holmstrom v. CR England. Inc.. 2000 UT App 239,^26, 8 P.3d 281 
(holding "party must specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought cto a "level of 
consciousness"'"); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting 
objection timely because "met the requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his 
constitutional objection in the trial court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted )). 
Here, Jacob asserts his argument is preserved. The trial court heard argument on 
the admissibility of the pregnancy evidence and ruled the pregnancy evidence was 
inadmissible at the beginning of trial. R. 167:242-44. This entire discussion was 
conducted in an off-the-record bench conference. IdL_ At the end of trial, the parties and 
trial judge summarized the substance of the bench conference for the record. IcL at 242-
46. Although the record does not contain an exact transcript of the arguments and ruling, 
Jacob asserts the summary provided by the parties and trial court is sufficient to show his 
argument is preserved. See id. On the record, Jacob summarized his earlier argument, 
explaining he wanted the pregnancy evidence admitted because it was "relevant" since 
Nguyen said she "believed that she could have been pregnant with Mr. Jacob's child and 
that it turned out [she] wasn't." Id. at 242. Thus, just as positive pregnancy evidence 
2 
would have been admitted to show "that they had had sex" so Nguyen's stated belief in 
Jacob's fatherhood was true, negative pregnancy testimony should have been admitted to 
show the opposite—that "they didn't have sex" so Nguyen must have had an ulterior 
motive for saying she believed Jacob was the father. Id. at 242-43. The State then 
summarized its objection to the pregnancy evidence by saying the pregnancy evidence 
had "no relevance" and its admission "would be violative of [rule] 412 which governs the 
admissibility of alleged victims' prior sexual behavior." Id. at 243. 
In its ruling, the trial court agreed with the State. Id. at 243-44. Summarizing its 
ruling, the trial court said the pregnancy evidence "is an irrelevant consideration because, 
as has been stated, it neither proves nor disproves the rape." Id. at 243. Besides, the 
pregnancy evidence, if admitted, "would reflect upon the victim and her credibility to the 
extent that she did have other sexual conduct during that time. And it seems to me, 
therefore, it would fall right squarely within sub (a)l of Rule 412." Id_ at 244. By so 
ruling, the trial court necessarily rejected Jacob's argument that the pregnancy evidence 
impeached the credibility of Nguyen's stated belief that Jacob was the child's father. Id.; 
see State v. Martin. 1999 UT 72,f 16, 984 P.2d 975 (holding rule 412 does not exclude 
"[e]vidence of a false accusation" because "relevant to [victim's] credibility"). Thus, 
Jacob asserts the record is sufficient to show his argument is preserved because he 
presented his argument to the trial court and the trial court rejected the argument by 
ruling the pregnancy evidence was inadmissible under rule 412(a)(1). 
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Moreover, Jacob asserts the preservation of his argument was strengthened by his 
own testimony. Jacob testified he lost "interest" in Nguyen when she rejected his sexual 
advances so he "basically cut her off and "wouldn't even speak to her at work." R. 
167:199. But Nguyen was "playing some kind of game" and was really interested in him 
even though she initially "said no." IdL Consequently, "she got mad" when he snubbed 
her "and retaliated by doing this." IcL In other words, he viewed their separation as 
"permanent." but "she thought it was a temporary" so she was angry because "she was 
looking for an old man, she wanted to have a baby and get citizenship and stuff." IcL at 
200. By so testifying, Jacob made clear why he wanted the pregnancy evidence 
admitted—to support his defense that Nguyen invented the rape story to revenge his break 
with her and to force him into a position of responsibility over her unborn child. IdL The 
State argues Jacob's testimony could not add to preservation because the trial court ruled 
before Jacob testified. Aple. Br. at 20. The trial court, however, did not enter its ruling 
into the record until after Jacob's testimony, at which time the trial court said his "view 
was at the time of the bench conference, and still is" that the pregnancy evidence was 
inadmissible under rule 412(a)(1). R. 167:243 (emphasis added). In other words, the 
trial court had Jacob's entire argument, including Jacob's own testimony^ before it when 
it ultimately ruled the pregnancy evidence was inadmissible.1 Id. 
1
 For this same reason, the trial court's error was obvious. Nguyen's credibility 
was crucial to the State's case. R. 167:243-44 (trial judge noting "issue before . . . the 
fact finder simply was do they believe the victim who alleges the rape"). Jacob's right to 
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II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE PREGNANCY 
TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULES 608(c) AND 
412(b)(3) OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE AND ITS 
EXCLUSION CAUSED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
First, the State concedes that"[notwithstanding a rape victim's rule 412 
protections, [Jacob] has a right to cross-examine [Nguyen] for bias, prejudice or motive 
to fabricate." Aple. Br. at 21-22 (citing Utah R. Evid. 608(c); Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S. 
308 (1974); Delaware v. Van ArsdelL 475 U.S. 673 (1986)). Regardless, the State 
argues the trial court did not err by excluding the pregnancy evidence because Jacob has 
not shown Nguyen's pregnancy "was relevant to any arguable motive she may have had 
to lie." Aple. Br. at 22. Specifically, the State complains the motives presented by Jacob 
(Nguyen wanted to punish Jacob for snubbing her and Nguyen wanted to force Jacob 
into a position of responsibility over her unborn child) are "nonsensical" because: (1) 
attack Nguyen's credibility by revealing her motives to lie was expressly protected by the 
rules of evidence, the Utah Code and the Constitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 
(2002) ("[I]n every case the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question . . . by 
evidence affecting his character for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his motives."); Utah 
R. Evid. 412 Adv. Committee Note (noting "court may not exclude evidence of an 
alleged victim's sexual behavior or predisposition if to do so would deny the accused 
Constitutional protections."); Utah R. Evid. 608(c). In fact, the State concedes Jacob had 
a right to attack Nguyen's credibility by cross-examining her about her motives to lie. 
Aple. Br. at 22-23. Regardless, the trial court stood by its decision to exclude the 
pregnancy evidence throughout the trial and reiterated its ruling at the close of trial, even 
though it heard defense counsel's argument and watched Jacob struggle during his 
testimony to explain Nguyen's motive for lying without revealing the pregnancy 
evidence. R. 167:199-200,243-44,245-46. Accordingly, Jacobs asserts that even if his 
argument was not preserved, this Court should still reverse because the trial court's error 
was plain. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at Tfl3 (explaining plain error exists if there was 
error and the error was obvious and prejudicial); supra Part II. 
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Jacob "could hardly" assume "financial or other responsibility" over Nguyen's child if 
incarcerated for rape; (2) any chance Jacob would be ordered to support Nguyen's child 
was "arguably refuted by DNA evidence"; and (3) even if Nguyen wanted to punish 
Jacob, there is no reason to believe she would "falsely accuse" him of impregnating her. 
Id. at 22-23. Each of these complaints, however, are questions for the jury. See Davis, 
415 U.S. at 317 (holding trial court erred by denying defendant opportunity to cross-
examine about possible motive to lie). As explained in Davis , an appellate court cannot 
"speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of the credibility of a witness, would have 
accepted th[e] line of reasoning" introduced by a defendant's cross-examination about a 
potential bias. Id Rather, jurors are "entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory 
before them so that they c[an] make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on 
[the witness'] testimony," especially if the testimony provides "'a crucial link in the proof 
. . . of petitioner's act.'" Id, (citation omitted). 
Besides, the motive for lying that Jacob proposed to introduce through the 
pregnancy evidence was compelling and could have impeached Nguyen's credibility. 
Had the pregnancy evidence been admitted, the jury could easily have believed Nguyen 
initially invented the rape story to punish Jacob for snubbing her and to place him in a 
position where he would be forced to remain in her and her child's life. R. 167:199-200. 
Then, once the reality of the situation set in and she realized her plan was not going to 
work, Nguyen continued her charade because she felt it was too late to tell the truth. Id . 
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This possibility is strengthened by the fact that Nguyen's story changed after the 
criminalist tested the evidence and found no seminal fluid anywhere. Compare R. 
166:99 (officer testifying Nguyen told him that after Jacob penetrated her "for three or 
four minutes, she asked him to stop and please put on a condom, which he did. Then he 
continued to rape her for another, according to her, 30 to 40 minutes11); R. 166:59 
(Nguyen testifying at trial that Jacob wore the condom at first but then decided "it 
bugged him somehow so he threw that away"); see. R. 166:132. 
Second, the State argues that even if the trial court erred by excluding the 
pregnancy evidence, this Court should not reverse because the error was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Aple. Br. at 24-25. Specifically, the State argues the error was 
harmless because Jacob, if he introduced the pregnancy evidence, "risked bolstering 
[Nguyen's] testimony that they had sex and contradicting his primary defense 
theory—that no sex occurred." Id. at 25. This argument, however, does not show 
harmlessness. Jacob's motive-to-lie defense, like many defenses, placed him at risk 
because the jury could choose to disbelieve his theory. R. 167:245-46. But this risk was 
Jacob's to assume, and he willing assumed it. Id. at 242-43, 245. Jacob's defense was 
that Nguyen, the key witness against him, was lying. IcL at 243-44 (trial judge noting 
that "issue . . . before the fact finder simply was do they believe the victim who alleges 
the rape or do they believe Mr. Jacob that there was no sexual contact"). The only way 
he could show Nguyen had a motive to lie was to admit the pregnancy evidence. Id. at 
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199-200. Without the pregnancy evidence, Jacob's defense rang hollow. IcL at 228 
(defense counsel arguing inclosing that Nguyen lied, by acknowledging Nguyen's 
motivation for lying "is unknown at this point"); id. at 240-41 (State arguing in closing 
that Nguyen "doesn't need to come in here and make false allegations. What benefit is 
there for her in doing that? What would make it worth it? Well, what makes it worth it 
is if she is seeking justice for herself and she is talking about the truth"). Thus, the 
chance that the jury would have rejected Jacob's theory does not reduce the prejudice 
that Jacob suffered when the trial court prevented him from presenting his defense at all. 
The State also argues the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt because it is "unlikely the jury would have accepted [Jacob's] testimony over 
[Nguyen's] if only trial counsel had asked about her pregnancy." Aple. Br. at 26 (citation 
omitted). This argument fails, however, because Nguyen's credibility was weak and, had 
Jacob been permitted to reveal her motive for lying, it is likely the jury would have 
rejected Nguyen's testimony altogether. Jacob's story during the investigation was 
merely inconsistent in the sense that "he didn't have much detail to begin, but more detail 
later." R. 166:125. On the other hand, Nguyen's story changed dramatically once the 
criminalist failed to find any seminal fluid anywhere, including in the condom. IcL. at 
132. When Officer McCarthy interviewed Nguyen immediately after the incident and 
before DNA testing was conducted, Nguyen told him that after Jacob penetrated her "for 
three or four minutes, she asked him to stop and please put on a condom, which he did. 
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Then he continued to rape her for another, according to her, 30 to 40 minutes'1 IcL_ at 99. 
At trial, however, Nguyen testified, consistent with the DNA evidence, that Jacob wore 
the condom at first but then decided "it bugged him somehow so he threw that away." 
Id. at 59. This inconsistent testimony obviously troubled the jury since the jury 
deliberated for 2 Vi hours and asked the judge for clarification on the skin cell evidence 
before returning a verdict. R. 111-13. Thus, had the jury been allowed to hear Jacob's 
theory on why Nguyen was lying, rather than just his bald statement that she was lying, 
there is a substantial likelihood they would have rejected Nguyen's testimony and 
acquitted. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232-33 (1988) (holding exclusion of 
cohabitation evidence that revealed motive to lie was prejudicial because victim's 
"testimony was central, indeed crucial, to the prosecution's case" and State's case "was 
far from overwhelming"). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse because Jacob's argument is preserved and the trial 
court committed prejudicial error by excluding the pregnancy evidence. 
SUBMITTED this /* /* day of February, 2005. 
^ ^ ? -^ 
LOR! J. SEP>I 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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